YOL-Washington
UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan will arrive in Washington DC on September 23, 2024 for an official visit to the United States. This will be his first visit since 2017 and the first time a sitting UAE president will meet at the White House. While the visit is historic for relations, the significance of the talks themselves will depend on how the two countries address a range of sensitive bilateral issues at a time of regional crises on multiple fronts.
The United States currently views the UAE as a key strategic partner in addressing a range of regional and global challenges, the report added. The strong ties between the two countries include a mutually beneficial economic relationship, robust defense cooperation, and significant diplomatic engagements.
According to the Washington Institute report, UAE leaders are likely to focus on the future of economic and technological integration between the two countries, but sensitive issues such as great power concerns about China and Russia, nuclear proliferation in the region and the UAE’s potential role in a post-war Gaza will also be discussed.
Complex relationships with key regional partners
The federation of seven small Persian Gulf states has long been a world-class player thanks to its vast oil wealth and the leadership style of Sheikh Mohammed, or MbZ. That status is surprising considering the country gained independence just 50 years ago and has an estimated population of just 10 million, about 90% of whom are foreign workers. MbZ is both the ruler of Abu Dhabi (the emirate that is home to most of the UAE’s oil) and president of the federation, titles he acquired upon the death of his half-brother Khalifa in 2022.
Originally, the main factor that brought the two countries closer was geography: the UAE is located just across from Iran in the Gulf. But today, Washington sees the UAE as a key strategic partner on a range of regional and global challenges. Strong ties between the two countries include mutually beneficial economic relations, robust defense cooperation and major diplomatic initiatives.
On the economic side, the UAE is the largest importer of U.S. goods in the Middle East, reaching $24.8 billion in 2023 and continuing to grow this year. On the defense side, it is home to large U.S. military bases at bases such as Al Dhafra, where approximately 5,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed along with assets related to refueling, reconnaissance, and other capabilities. The UAE is also an experienced military partner that has participated in U.S.-led coalitions focused on Afghanistan, the Balkans, Kuwait, Libya, and the Islamic State, all of which have contributed to strengthening bilateral security ties.
When it comes to major U.S. policy initiatives in the region, the UAE is a founding member of the Abraham Accords and made the bold decision to normalize relations with Israel and maintain diplomatic and commercial ties as the war in the Gaza Strip continues. The UAE is also a key base in Washington’s efforts to establish an integrated air defense and missile capability in the Middle East, though it has not publicly claimed a role in preventing Iranian or proxy missiles and drones from hitting Israel during the unprecedented direct attack on April 13. Indeed, UAE and U.S. officials agree that Iran is a destabilizing factor in the region, but have recently diverged on how best to address this threat. Since 2019, the UAE has focused on easing tensions through backdoor negotiations with Tehran to defuse Iranian aggression and provocations.
Other bilateral differences date back to Biden’s time as vice president, including disagreements over the Arab Spring protests and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which the administration negotiated without consulting Gulf states. The UAE has also long been concerned that the U.S. will minimize its engagement in the Middle East as it rebalances to the Indo-Pacific. Washington, meanwhile, sees many of the UAE’s policy preferences as counterproductive, from its resistance to implementing sanctions on Iran and Russia to its role in sparking past rifts between Gulf states and Qatar.
Tensions between the two countries escalated in January 2022 when the Houthis attacked Abu Dhabi with missiles and drones in response to the rise of UAE-backed militias during the Yemen war, and the UAE deemed the US response insufficient, despite the Biden administration sending a naval destroyer and aircraft to the UAE to thwart further attacks.
The administration has also repeatedly warned Abu Dhabi about certain aspects of its relationship with China. In the final hours of the Trump administration in January 2021, an agreement was reached to sell F-35 fighter jets and MQ-9 Reaper drones to the UAE. While the MQ-9 sale is still ongoing, the F-35 deal has stalled after reports emerged that Chinese military facilities are being built in the UAE. US officials are also wary of Beijing’s influence over UAE technology companies, as seen by the company G42, which faced intense scrutiny over its extensive ties to China and potential threats to US proprietary information. The company has since said it will divest from China (though how much is up for debate) and announced a $1.5 billion deal with Microsoft, which included a Microsoft executive taking the helm as chairman of its board and a series of artificial intelligence initiatives.
Why visit now?
Prince Mohammed’s visit would be an opportunity for him and Biden to resolve the tensions mentioned above and deliver some short-term victories to close out Biden’s term as president. It would also be a chance to further deepen his relationship with Vice President Harris, whom he first met when she led a US delegation to mourn the death of Prince Mohammed’s brother, and who he will meet again at the COP28 climate change conference hosted by the UAE later in 2023. A meeting with former President Trump also seems likely, but has yet to be confirmed as of this writing. By timing his visit just six weeks before the US election, Prince Mohammed is likely seeking to spread his risk and position the country for success regardless of who wins the White House and Congress in November.
The public agenda for the meeting, outlined by the U.S.-UAE Business Council, will focus on energy, health, AI, space and defense. The UAE is keen to transform a partnership rooted in defense and security cooperation to one based primarily on economic and technological integration. Deliverables are likely to include a G42 divestment from China and a new deal with Microsoft, other technology collaborations that will boost the UAE’s desire to be a regional digital technology leader, and further implementation of economic initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Abu Dhabi has also just commissioned the fourth and final reactor at its first civilian nuclear facility, putting it on track to meet the goal set at COP28. Relatedly, the visit will also likely discuss the UAE’s “123 commitment” not to enrich or reprocess nuclear material. Crown Prince Mohammed may want to assess whether there is a supplemental agreement (similar to the civil nuclear agreement reportedly being discussed on the sidelines of U.S.-Saudi talks on a potential defense pact) that would allow the UAE to break its 123 commitment if other regional states (especially Iran) develop military nuclear capabilities.
Other security issues likely to emerge include the role of UAE companies in supplying Russia with sanctions-hit dual-use goods facilitating the Ukraine war. Washington also hopes to influence the UAE’s messaging to Tehran to thwart attacks by Iranian proxies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Moreover, John Kirby, in announcing MbZ’s visit, specifically mentioned the UAE’s problematic role in Sudan. A debate on that point could be difficult. Washington disputes Abu Dhabi’s support for Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo’s Rapid Support Forces against the government, while the UAE officially denies supplying arms to the RSF.
Conversely, the UAE has long sought deeper regional security guarantees from the US. Previous talks on a bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement stalled, but given that a US-Saudi defence treaty is imminent, Crown Prince Mohammed will likely raise the issue again. Contrary to reports, officials may also resume talks on the F-35.
As for the Gaza war, Prince Mohammed will likely address the possibility of the UAE playing a role in the Gaza Strip once fighting stops and Israeli forces withdraw. The UAE is the only country that has publicly stated its intention to send ground troops as part of a multinational stabilization force, provided a ceasefire is established and the US agrees to lead the resumption of the movement towards Palestinian statehood. On September 14, Prince Mohammed’s brother, Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, went further, saying that the UAE will not play any “tomorrow” role in Gaza unless a Palestinian state is established. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has signaled that a ceasefire is unlikely at this point, so discussions on Gaza next week are likely to focus on the current state of the conflict and what the UAE has offered so far.
Conclusion
Given the various tensions that have arisen between the UAE and Washington since the beginning of his administration, President Biden’s decision to welcome MbZ to the Oval Office indicates his willingness to embrace a partnership and solidify areas of cooperation and mutual interest. Washington’s “demands” are easy to guess. The administration wants Abu Dhabi to back up its statement on technological decoupling with China, give further assurances that it is protecting US defense know-how, and provide support for its “next-day” plans in Gaza. It is difficult to predict what the UAE will ask the US for, but MbZ will probably continue to press Israel to minimize civilian casualties in Gaza and ensure access to humanitarian aid, as well as to seek deeper regional security guarantees.
Simon Henderson is a Baker Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of its Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy. Elizabeth Dent is a senior fellow at the Institute and a former director for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula at the Department of Defense.